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Trial Practice and Procedure
by Brandon L. Peak,* John C. Morrison IlI,"
Tedra C. Hobson,*** Mary K. Weeks,""

Jeb Butler,***** Anna W. Howard,.....
and Morgan E. Duncan****
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses several significant cases and legislation of
interest to the Georgia civil trial practitioner occurring during the
survey period of this publication.'
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1. For an analysis of Georgia trial practice and procedure during the prior survey
period, see Kate S. Cook et al., Trial Practiceand Procedure, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 64 MERCER L. REV. 305 (2012).
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II. LEGISLATION
During the survey period, the Georgia General Assembly enacted
several substantive laws of potential interest to practitioners. For
example, the Georgia Taxpayer Protection False Claims Act' will now
permit civil actions under certain circumstances against persons or
entities submitting false claims to the state of Georgia.? Practitioners
who work on trucking cases should carefully review House Bill 865,"
enacting the Georgia Motor Common Carrier Act of 2012.' Several
sections of Title 51,6 governing torts, were also enacted during the
survey period. House Bill 499,' providing that payor guidelines and
federal criteria "shall not establish a legal basis for negligence or a
standard of care for medical malpractice or product liability" claims,'
and House Bill 94,9 relating to the calculation of damages in tort
claims,"o are noteworthy.
Trial lawyers should also review several bills that could affect
procedural issues in their cases. Of particular note is House Bill 336,u
which specifies requirements for a presuit offer of settlement made by
an attorney in a tort claim for death or injury arising from the use of a
motor vehicle." In addition, House Bill 665,"3 clarifying the qualifications of persons who are eligible to serve as grand or trial jurors,' 4 and
House Bill 247,1' requiring individuals seeking to become guardians or
conservators to submit to a criminal-history background check if

2. Ga. H.R. Bill 822, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 141 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 23-3-120
to -127 (Supp. 2013), and in scattered sections of O.C.G.A.).
3. Id.
4. Ga. H.R. Bill 865, Reg. Sess., 2012 Ga. Laws 632 (codified in scattered sections of
O.C.G.A. tit. 40 (Supp. 2013)).

5. Id.
6. O.C.G.A. tit. 51 (Supp. 2013).
7. Ga. H.R. Bill 499, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 627 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 51-1-52
(Supp. 2013)).
8. Id.
9. Ga. H.R. Bill 94, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 759 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 51-12-13
(Supp. 2013)).
10. Id.
11. Ga. H.R. Bill 336, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 860 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1
(Supp. 2013)).
12. Id.
13. Ga. H.R. Bill 665, Reg. Sess., 2012 Ga. Laws 173 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 15-12-40, 40.1, -60 (Supp. 2013)).
14. Id.
15. Ga. H.R. Bill 247, Reg. Sess., 2012 Ga. Laws 83 (codified in relevant parts at
O.C.G.A. § 29-9-19 (Supp. 2013)).
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requested by the court," both became effective on July 1, 2012.17 The
Uniform Interstate Depositions and Discovery Acts also became
effective during the survey period.19 Finally, a portion of House Bill
359,0 which became effective May 6, 2013, provides that rights of

action for legal malpractice are not assignable. 1
III.

A.

CASE LAW

Statute of Limitations
In Norred v. Teaver," the Georgia Court of Appeals, sitting en banc

and overruling its prior precedent, held that section 9-3-72 of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), 2" the statute of limitations when
"a foreign object has been left in a patient's body,"" applies regardless
of whether the object was left in the body intentionally or unintentionally.25 The court reasoned that the statutory language was unambiguous

16. Id.
17. Ga. H.R. Bill 247; Ga. H.R. Bill 665.
18. Ga. H.R. Bill 46, Reg. Sess., 2012 Ga. Laws 651 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 24-13-110
to -116 (Supp. 2013)).
19. Id. This Act, intended to manage the issuance, service, and enforcement of
subpoenas, repealed the Uniform Foreign Depositions Act and is divided into two parts:
Part I, which became effective July 1, 2011 and was repealed effective January 1, 2013,
applies to subpoenas served on or after July 1, 2011, and to actions pending on or after
July 1, 2011; and Part II, which became effective January 1, 2013, applies to subpoenas
served on or after January 1, 2013, and to actions pending on or after July 1, 2013. Id.
20. Ga. H.R. Bill 359, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 636 (codified in relevant parts at
O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24 (Supp. 2013)).
21. Id. This provision was enacted in response to the Georgia Supreme Court's decision
in Villanueva v. First American Title Insurance Co., 292 Ga. 630, 740 S.E.2d 108 (2013).
Despite opposition from the State Bar of Georgia, the supreme court in Villanueva held
that "the assignment of legal malpractice claims is not prohibited as a matter of law." Id.
at 632, 740 S.E.2d at 110. The court reserved ruling on whether in other circumstances,
such as when the legal malpractice claim could be considered a personal tort, attorney
malpractice may not be assignable. Id. at 635, 740 S.E.2d at 112.
22. 320 Ga. App. 508, 740 S.E.2d 251 (2013).
23. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-72 (2007).
24. Id.
25. Norred, 320 Ga. App. at 512, 740 S.E.2d at 253-54. A majority of the judges
concurred fully in the decision, with two judges concurring specially. Id. at 514, 740 S.E.2d
at 255. The concurrence disagreed with the decision to overrule prior precedent. Id.
(Andrews, P.J., concurring specially). Nonetheless, the rules required only a majority to
effectively overrule the court's precedent when the appellate court is sitting en banc.
O.C.G.A. § 15-3-1(d) (2012).
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in its application to all objects that do not originate in the person's

body.26
B. Immunity
27
the plaintiff
In Hagan v. Georgia Department of ransportation,
failing to
for
sued the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT)
28
court of
The
maintain a sidewalk where she fell and injured herself.
appeals held that GDOT's "specific decision to forego routine inspections,
repairs, or maintenance of sidewalks within a state right-of-way as a
result of prioritizing maintenance activities based on budgetary
constraints" fell under the discretionary function exception to the
Georgia Tort Claims Act," thus making GDOT immune from liability.30
C.

Mootness
WMW, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co." involved a dispute about
the future location of an automobile dealership franchise.3 ' After the
Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the case, American
Honda Motor Co. (Honda), the franchisor, unilaterally decided not to
place a new dealership at the disputed site.33 It therefore filed an
unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal as moot.34 The court noted
that the mootness issue was a novel one in Georgia courts and adopted
the Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 10003 "
reasoning.36 It held that "[an appellee's 'voluntary cessation of
challenged conduct does not ordinarily render a case moot because a
dismissal for mootness would permit a resumption of the challenged
conduct as soon as the case is dismissed.'"3' The court therefore denied
the motion to dismiss and considered the merits of the case.

26. Norred, 320 Ga. App. at 512, 740 S.E.2d at 253-54.
27. 321 Ga. App. 472, 739 S.E.2d 123 (2013).
28. Id. at 472, 739 S.E.2d at 125.
29. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-20 to -37 (2013); see also O.C.GA. § 51-21-24 (providing specific
exceptions to state liability).
30. Hagan, 321 Ga. App. at 477-78, 739 S.E.2d at 128.
31. 291 Ga. 683, 733 S.E.2d 269 (2012).
32. Id. at 683-84, 733 S.E.2d at 271-72.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
36. WMW, Inc., 291 Ga. at 685, 733 S.E.2d at 273.
37. Id. (quoting Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2287).
38. Id. at 686, 733 S.E.2d at 273.
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Laches
In Marsh v. Clarke County School District," the supreme court
resolved two conflicting lines of cases regarding the defense of laches in
mandamus claims.40 Mandamus is considered a legal claim, although
it is "an extraordinary legal remedy ... much like a mandatory injunction," and is "quasi-equitable in its nature."' Under one line of prior
cases, the court held that because laches is an equitable defense, it could
not apply to actions at law, including a mandamus claim.42 But the
court in Marsh sided with the older and "better[-]reasoned" line of cases,
which held claims for mandamus could be barred by gross laches.43

D.

E. Preemption
In American General FinancialServices v. Jape," the State Court of
Cherokee County denied the plaintiff's motion to compel arbitration and
also denied its application for interlocutory appeal of the issue." The
plaintiff filed a direct appeal in the court of appeals, which the court
denied based on a lack ofjurisdiction because the plaintiff did not appeal
under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b)'s 46 interlocutory procedure.4 7 The plaintiff
contended it did not have to follow the interlocutory procedure because
under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 48 it had the right to a direct
appeal, which preempted Georgia's interlocutory procedure. 49 The
supreme court granted certiorari to consider the question.o
The supreme court held that the FAA's right to direct appeal did not
preempt Georgia's interlocutory appeal procedure." Where a statute
contains no express preemption provisions, federal law will only preempt
state law to the extent the state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of

39. 292 Ga. 28, 732 S.E.2d 443 (2012).
40. Id. at 30, 732 S.E.2d at 445.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 29-30, 732 S.E.2d at 445.
43. Id. at 30, 732 S.E.2d at 445.
44. 291 Ga. 637, 732 S.E.2d 746 (2012).
45. Id. at 638, 732 S.E.2d at 747.
46. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b) (2013).
47. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 291 Ga. at 638, 732 S.E.2d at 747.
48. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1XB) (2012).
49. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 291 Ga. at 639, 732 S.E.2d at 748.
50. Id. at 637-38, 732 S.E.2d at 747. The United States Supreme Court has not
addressed the question whether the FAA's procedural rules also apply to state courts. Id.
at 640, 732 S.E.2d at 749.
51. Id. at 642, 732 S.E.2d at 750.
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Congress."" The court reasoned that the interlocutory procedure did
not undermine the purposes or objectives of the FAA. 3 Because
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b) does not single out cases involving arbitration
agreements and treats them the same as cases involving other contracts,
the court held that the statute is consistent with Congress's intent and
not preempted by the FAA.14
F

Venue

In Wang v. Liu," the supreme court addressed whether, when
adjudicating a motion to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, trial courts must detail their findings on each of the
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31.1(a)56 factors. 57 Reversing a prior line of cases
from the court of appeals, the supreme court held that "we acknowledge
explicitly that specific findings on each of the enumerated statutory
factors are a better practice, but we cannot conclude that such findings
are required absolutely in every case."" Instead, the court explained
that "[wihat is required to permit meaningful appellate review is that
the trial court set out upon the record the essential reasoning that forms
the basis for its exercise of discretion to grant or deny a motion to
dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens." 9
Following the dismissal of the resident defendants, the plaintiff in
Richardson v. Gilbert6 0 sought to transfer venue from Spalding County
to Clayton County, where the remaining defendant resided at the time
the suit was filed. The defendant, however, waived her venue defense
and sought to keep the case in Spalding County." The State Court of
Spalding County granted the motion to transfer and the court of appeals
reversed, holding that "[a] plaintiff lacks standing to object to jurisdiction or venue over a nonresident defendant who waived his venue
defenses."62

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 639, 732 S.E.2d at 748 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
Id. at 642, 732 S.E.2d at 750.
Id. at 642-43, 732 S.E.2d at 750.
292 Ga. 568, 740 S.E.2d 136 (2013).
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31.1(a) (2007).
Wang, 292 Ga. at 569-70, 740 S.E.2d at 139.
Id. at 570, 740 S.E.2d at 139-40.
Id. at 570, 740 S.E.2d at 140.
319 Ga. App. 72, 733 S.E.2d 783 (2012).
Id. at 73, 733 S.E.2d at 784.
Id. at 74, 733 S.E.2d at 785.
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Dismissaland Renewal
In Parsonsv. Mertz," the court of appeals overruled prior cases that
appeared to "require dismissal of all breach of contract cases where joint
obligors cannot be joined."44 Instead, the court held that "[t]o determine if a joint obligor is an indispensable party, the trial court must
consider the factors set forth in [O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19(b)] in light of the
substantive law regarding contractual joint obligors.""
The court in Walker v. Mecca 66 reaffirmed its prior decisions, holding
that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a)(3)6 7 "applies when an action seeking recovery
on the same claim was brought and dismissed twice, regardless of the
parties named as defendants."' As a result, a plaintiff was barred
from bringing a third lawsuit arising from the same automobile wreck,
even though not all of the defendants named in the third lawsuit were
named in each of the prior two lawsuits." In a special concurrence, in
which she also concurred fully in the majority opinion, Presiding Judge
Barnes encouraged the Georgia legislature to "amend [O.C.G.A. § 9-11411 so that the 'two[-] dismissal' rule applies only to the same or
substantially the same defendant."0 o
In Crawford v. Kingston,n the court of appeals also interpreted
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41,72 determining that a federal dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction was involuntary, and therefore such dismissal
could not operate as an adjudication on the merits for purposes of the
statute."
G.

63. 320 Ga. App. 786, 740 S.E.2d 743 (2013).
64. Id. at 791 n.18, 740 S.E.2d at 747 n.18 (overruling Indus. Mech., Inc. v. Siemens
Energy & Automation, Inc., 230 Ga. App. 1, 495 S.E.2d 103 (1997); Turner Outdoor Adver.,
Ltd. v. Old S. Corp., 185 Ga. App. 582, 365 S.E.2d 149 (1988)).
65. Id. (interpreting O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19(b) (2006)).
66. 320 Ga. App. 142, 739 S.E.2d 450 (2013).
67. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a)(3) (2006).
68. Walker, 320 Ga. App. at 143, 739 S.E.2d at 451.
69. Id. at 143-44, 739 S.E.2d at 451.
70. Id. at 144, 739 S.E.2d at 452 (Barnes, P.J., concurring specially); see also O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-41 (2006).
71. 316 Ga. App. 313, 728 S.E.2d 904 (2012).
72. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41 (2006).
73. Crawford, 316 Ga. App. at 315, 728 S.E.2d at 906 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-41(a)).
The court also held that the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs third complaint,
noting that because the plaintiff never actually served the defendant with the second
complaint (the one filed in federal court), "it was void and could not amount to a renewal
of the first complaint" for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61. 316 Ga. App. at 316, 728 S.E.2d
at 906-07 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 (2007)).
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74
the court of appeals held as a matter of first
In Green v. Flanagan,
impression that under the renewal statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61,'5 an
arbitration was not a proceeding that could be renewed within six
months of its discontinuation or dismissal." The court observed that
an "[airbitration is not a judicial proceeding, of course; it is an alternative to a judicial proceeding" and analogized to other cases "suggestling]
that official, quasi-judicial proceedings do not properly form the basis for
a renewal under [O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61].""

H.

Service
In Ragan v. Mallow," the court of appeals "overruleld] prior cases
holding incorrectly that service by publication can never confer personal
jurisdiction."" The court observed,
If the defendant is a resident who is actually present within the
jurisdiction of the court, has actual knowledge of the suit, and "wilfully
secrets himself in order to frustrate all reasonable efforts. to effect
personal service," then the service by publication affords sufficient due
process and confers personal jurisdiction over the defendant.o
The court held, however, that the Superior Court of Fulton County erred
in dismissing the plaintiff's case "without deciding whether the
defendant acted in bad faith to avoid personal service, 'whether the
plaintiff exercised the appropriate diligence, and whether any other
utilized method of service should be considered valid,"' and the court
remanded the case for the superior court to make such determinations.

74. 317 Ga. App. 152, 730 S.E.2d 161 (2012).
75. O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 (2007).
76. Green, 317 Ga. App. at 155, 730 S.E.2d at 163 (noting that the court had found "no
Georgia cases specifically concerning" the issue).
77. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61).
78. 319 Ga. App. 443, 744 S.E.2d 337 (2012).
79. Id. at 443, 744 S.E.2d at 338.
80. Id. at 446-47, 744 S.E.2d at 340 (quoting Melton v. Johnson, 242 Ga. 400,403, 249
S.E.2d 82, 84 (1978)).
81. Id. at 446, 744 S.E.2d at 340 (quoting plaintiffs brief). The court also held "that
the defendant did not waive his affirmative defenses by filing a notice of his intent to
introduce the plaintiffs medical narrative" because such "did not manifest an intention on
the defendant's part to relinquish his defenses, but simply preserved an evidentiary issue
should it arise later." Id. at 446, 744 S.E.2d at 339-40.
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L The Health Insurance Portabilityand Accountability Act (HIPAA)
and Other Privilege Issues
In Arby's Restaurant Group, Inc. v. McRae,82 the supreme court held
that the defendant in a workers' compensation case could properly meet
ex parte with the claimant's treating physician for an informal interview." The court held,
Under the unambiguous language of [O.C.G.A. § 34-9-207(a)], any
privilege the employee may have had in protected medical records and
information related to a workers' compensation claim is waived once
the employee submits a claim for workers' compensation benefits or is
receiving weekly income benefits or the employer has paid any medical
expenses."
The court distinguished Baker v. Wellstar Health System, Inc.," in
which the court held that in some circumstances such ex parte informal
interviews were barred by HIPAA,8" as "a medical malpractice case ...
subject to HIPAA's requirements for disclosure.""

In Wellstar Health System, Inc. v. Jordan," the supreme court held
that in a medical malpractice case where the defendant had conducted
ex parte interviews of the plaintiff's treating physicians and had
transcribed those interviews pursuant to a qualified protective order, the
transcripts constituted attorney work product."
During the survey period, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia entered two orders extending the circumstances in which the attorney-client privilege may be waived and
limiting the instances in which the privilege may be used to withhold
documents.o

In the case of In re Capital One Bank Credit Card Interest Rate
Litigation,91 a putative class action, the district court considered the

82. 292 Ga. 243, 734 S.E.2d 55 (2012).
83. Id. at 243, 247, 734 S.E.2d at 56, 58; see also O.C.G.A. § 34-9-207(a) (2008 & Supp.
2013).
84. Arby's Rest. Grp., Inc., 292 Ga. at 244,734 S.E.2d at 56 (interpreting O.C.G.A. § 349-207(a)).
85. 288 Ga. 336, 703 S.E.2d 601 (2010).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(4) (2006).
87. Arby's Rest. Grp., Inc., 292 Ga. at 246, 734 S.E.2d at 57.
88. 293 Ga. 12, 743 S.E.2d 375 (2013).
89. Id. at 13, 17, 743 S.E.2d at 377, 380.
90. Camacho v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 287 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Ga. 2012); In re Capital
One Bank Credit Card Interest Rate Litig., 286 F.R.D. 676 (N.D. Ga. 2012) [hereinafter In
re Capital One].
91. 286 F.R.D. 676 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
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plaintiffs' challenges to the privilege log submitted by the defendants.92
The plaintiffs alleged that "it is unlikely that [the defendants Capital
One Bank (USA), N.A. and Capital One Financial Corp. (together
hereinafter Capital One)] performed an appropriate privilege review"
before submitting the log (and withholding the documents listed
thereon)." The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs in two key
respects: the defendants could not "claim attorney-client protection for
documents that have no recipient identified" and it could not "now assert
attorney-client protection on a number of documents that it misidentified
as attorney work-product."94
To the extent the defendants listed documents on the privilege log
without a recipient, the court found the privilege log "deficient in its
present form" because "[wihere there are no recipients listed, the court
has no way of knowing whether the communications remained confidential." The court ordered production of those documents.
To the extent the defendants also mistakenly asserted a work-product
protection objection rather than an attorney-client privilege objection,
the district court did not even reach the question of whether the
documents were actually privileged."
Instead, the court required
immediate production because the defendant had waived any purported
privilege protection." The court further found the defendant had
shown bad faith in responding to discovery requests.9 Earlier in the
case, the court had partially granted a motion to compel.' 00 In response, "Capital One then proceeded to 'dump' over 900,000 pages of
92. In re Capital One, 286 F.R.D. at 679; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(A) (2006 &
Supp. V 2011) ("When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable by claiming
that the information is privileged or subject to protection as trial-preparation material, the
party must: (i) expressly make the claim; and (ii) describe the nature of the documents,
communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed-and do so in a manner that,
without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to
assess the claim.").
93. In re Capital One, 286 F.R.D. at 679.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 681.
96. Id.
97. The court, relying on cases considering Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, FED.
R. Civ. P. 37 (2006 & Supp. 2011), instead considered whether waiver of any purported
privilege was appropriate as a discovery sanction. See In re Capital One, 286 F.R.D. at
679-80.
98. In re Capital One, 286 F.R.D. at 679-80. The attorney-client privilege may be
waived when a party (1) "fails to timely and properly object to a discovery request" or (2)
shows "unjustifiable delay, inexcusable conduct, or bad faith in responding to discovery
requests." Id. at 679.
99. Id. at 680.
100. Id.
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documents on [the plaintiffs], much of which was duplicative."'o'
Because the defendant had made it "much more difficult for [the]
[p]laintiffs' attorneys to sift through the evidence and prepare a case,"
the court found there was "sufficient evidence of bad faith in this
litigation to justify waiver of the privilege as to these documents."o 2
Thus, even while recognizing that "waiver of the attorney-client privilege
is an extreme sanction," the court considered the defendant's discovery
misconduct as a whole in requiring production of the documents.'s
The district court's rationale and findings send a powerful message to
parties who may consider abusing the discovery process. Such parties
cannot fail to properly assert privilege objections, provide a facially
deficient privilege log, and then expect the court to grant them a "doover" when the discovering party files a motion to compel. Instead,
parties must meet the burden of proving privilege when they respond to
discovery requests. Parties who fail to do so risk waiver of otherwise
appropriate privilege claims.
In Camacho v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,1o' the district
court considered the attorney-client privilege in the context of an
insured's claim against its insurer arising from the insurer's alleged badfaith failure to settle a claim within the policy limits.' 05 During
discovery, the insured sought communications between the insurer and
the outside counsel it hired to represent the insured and defend the
claim against him, and the insurer objected on a number of grounds,
including attorney-client privilege. The insured argued that because the
outside counsel represented both the insurer and the insured, and the
interests of those two parties subsequently became adverse, the attorneyclient privilege did not apply.'06
Recognizing that "no Georgia court has yet to expressly hold that the
privilege vanishes when the same attorney represents both the insurer
and the insured under the joint-defense exception,"o' the court looked
to other jurisdictions for guidance, and ultimately concluded that "[the

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 679-80.
104. 287 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
105. Camacho, 287 F.R.D. at 690. Unlike In re Capital One, Camacho involved a
question of purely Georgia law, so the district court looked to Georgia attorney-client
privilege law. Id. at 691; see also Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brightman, 276 Ga. 683,
684, 580 S.E.2d 519, 521 (2003); S. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 268, 416 S.E.2d 274,
276 (1992).
106. Id. at 690-92; see also, e.g., Spence v. Hamm, 226 Ga. App. 357, 487 S.E.2d 9
(1997).
107. Camacho, 287 F.R.D. at 692.

288

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

defendant] cannot claim the protection of the attorney-client privilege
over its communications . . . regarding the defense of its insured in the

underlying action unrelated to the issue of coverage.""o Thus, the
court overruled the defendant's privilege objection and required
production of the documents.c 9
J.

Insurance
In Landrum v. Infinity Safeguard Insurance Co.,11 o the court of
appeals held that an automobile insurance policy exclusion for bodily
injury to a named insured was not void as against public policy where
the named insured was injured by a relative who was a permissive user
of the covered vehicle."' The court distinguished two earlier decisions1 12 in which the supreme court held that similar policy exclusions
violated public policy where the relative driving the vehicle was also a
named insured of the policy."' The court of appeals stated that it was
bound by its earlier decision in Spivey v. Safeway Insurance Co.," 4
which created a bright-line rule against voiding policy exclusions for
mere permissive users of the vehicle."'
In Reaves v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.," the
court of appeals, overruling Bone v. State Farm Mutual Insurance,"'
held that a plaintiff pursuing an uninsured motorist claim under
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(2)1" does not have to produce corroborating
evidence of physical contact between the plaintiff and the uninsured
vehicle when there is direct evidence of actual physical contact, such as
the plaintiff's statement that he was struck by an unidentified tractor
trailer."9

108. Id. at 693. The court allowed the privilege claim on coverage questions because
the interests of the insurer and the insured are always adverse when determining whether
coverage exists. Id.
109. Id.
110. 318 Ga. App. 701, 734 S.E.2d 520 (2012).
111. Id. at 704-05, 734 S.E.2d at 523.
112. Stepho v. Allstate Ins. Co., 259 Ga. 475, 383 S.E.2d 887 (1989); Se. Fid. Ins. Co.
v. Chaney, 259 Ga. 474, 381 S.E.2d 747 (1989).
113. Landrum, 318 Ga. App. at 703-04, 734 S.E.2d at 522.
114. 210 Ga. App. 775, 437 S.E.2d 641 (1993).
115. Landrum, 318 Ga. App. at 705, 734 S.E.2d at 523.
116. 319 Ga. App. 426, 734 S.E.2d 773 (2012).
117. 215 Ga. App. 782, 452 S.E.2d 523 (1994).
118. O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(bX2) (2000 & Supp. 2013).
119. Reaves, 319 Ga. App. at 428-30, 734 S.E.2d at 774-76.
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Tort Claims
In Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC,120 the supreme court answered
several certified questions regarding the availability and scope of an
appropriation-of-likeness claim under Georgia law.121 When the
plaintiff was fourteen years old, she exposed her breasts to two unknown
men in Panama City, Florida. The defendant ultimately obtained the
video clip and included it in its College Girls Gone Wild series. The
defendant also displayed a still photo of the plaintiff, taken from the
video clip, in a prominent position on the cover of the video.122
After determining Georgia law would apply, the court held that
Georgia law does not require a plaintiff to have any inherent or
preexisting value in her name before a wrongful appropriation takes
place and concluded that the facts of this case gave rise to a cause of
action for appropriation of the plaintiffs image.12 Th1 court further
held that recovery in an appropriation-of-likeness claim is limited to the
plaintiff's actual damages. 124 In order to collect damages, the plaintiff
would have to show that the use of her image actually added value to
the defendant's advertising efforts that otherwise would not have existed
without the use of her image, likely a difficult feat.125
In cases decided during the survey period, both the court of appeals
and the supreme court found that the assumption-of-the-risk defense
barred the plaintiffs' claims as a matter of law. 2 ' In Landings Ass'n
v. Williams, 27 the supreme court concluded as a matter of law that an
elderly woman killed by an alligator either assumed the risks of walking
in areas inhabited by alligators or failed to exercise ordinary care by
doing so.12' Likewise, in Kensington Place Owners Ass'n v. Thomas,'" the court of appeals held that a thirteen-year-old boy, killed
when a dead tree fell on him while he and his friends were attempting
to push it over, assumed the risk of his conduct as a matter of law.o3 0
K

120. 292 Ga. 748, 740 S.E.2d 622 (2013).
121. Id. at 748-50, 740 S.E.2d at 624-25.
122. Id. at 748, 740 S.E.2d at 624.
123. Id. at 751, 740 S.E.2d at 625-26. The court declined to address whether the
plaintiffs consent could be rendered invalid due to her age. Id. at 755, 740 S.E.2d at 628.
124. Id. at 754, 740 S.E.2d at 627-28.
125. Id. at 754-55, 740 S.E.2d at 628.
126. Landings Ass'n v. Williams, 219 Ga. 397,728 S.E.2d 577 (2012); Kensington Place
Owners Ass'n v. Thomas, 318 Ga. App. 609, 734 S.E.2d 445 (2012).
127. 291 Ga. 397, 728 S.E.2d 577 (2012).
128. Id. at 399, 728 S.E.2d at 580.
129. 318 Ga. App. 609, 734 S.E.2d 445 (2012).
130. Id. at 613-14, 734 S.E.2d at 449.
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Practitioners may wish to keep an eye on Johnson v. Omondi,'3 a
medical malpractice case in which the court of appeals concluded that
summary judgment for the defendants was proper because the plaintiffs
failed to produce "clear and convincing evidence" that the doctor failed
to "exercise even a slight degree of care.""'s A long dissent details the
conflicting evidence in the record and criticizes the majority for "fail[ing]
to give due consideration to the medical expert evidence and opinions in
reaching their erroneous conclusion that no genuine issues of fact exist
for jury determination," and "improperly expand[ing] the gross negligence standard under [O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c)]."as Certiorari was
granted on April 29, 2013.134

L. Class Actions
In Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair,LLC,' 3 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that clauses in
an employment contract that purported to compel arbitration of any
disputes and waive class-based proceedings were enforceable.'36 The
case arose out of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),"' which
expressly permits an aggrieved employee or employees to bring an action
"for and [oln behalf of himself or themselves and other employees
similarly situated."' The court noted "the increasing trend of federal
courts ... to uphold class [and] collective action waivers in mandatory
arbitration agreements" and observed that both the United States
Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit had upheld such waivers in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane

Corp.139 and Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.,14o respectively.141
However, the court concluded that neither case controlled directly; the
court wrote that "[clontrary to how it has sometimes been interpreted,
Gilmer did not expressly decide whether the right to proceed collectively
is a substantive right under the [FLSA]" 4 s and that because Caley had

131. 318 Ga. App. 787, 736 S.E.2d 129(2012), cert. granted, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 409 (Ga.
Apr. 29, 2013).
132. Id. at 792-94, 736 S.E.2d at 133-34; see also O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) (Supp. 2013).
133. 318 Ga. App. at 797, 799, 736 S.E.2d at 136, 138 (Miller, J., dissenting).
134. Johnson v. Omondi, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 409 (Ga. Apr. 29, 2013).
135. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56223 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 27, 2013).
136. Id. at *1-2.
137. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
138. Walthour, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56223, at *9 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006)).
139. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
140. 428 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2005).
141. Walthour, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56223, at *13.
142. Id. at *16-17.
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been decided on grounds of state-law unconscionability, it "did not
determine whether the right to proceed in a collective action was a nonwaivable substantive right."14 3 Therefore, despite finding the employee-plaintiff's arguments "persuasive," the court granted the defendant's
motions to compel arbitration and dismissed "so as to permit the Court
of Appeals itself to review the distinct issues presented here more
closely."144

M. Juries and Trials
In Kesterson v. Jarrett,4 s the supreme court held, as a matter of first
impression, that a party may not be excluded from trial "simply because
her physical and mental condition may evoke sympathy";4 " the party
may not be excluded unless she has been disruptive or has fabricated or
The State Court of
excessively paraded her injuries to the jury."
Clarke County excluded the plaintiff, a young girl with severe cerebral
palsy, from most of the liability portion of her medical malpractice trial
due to concerns that her physical and mental condition could evoke
sympathy, which would prejudice the defendants. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's exclusion, adopting a test from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.4 8 The supreme court
rejected the test adopted by the court of appeals, stating that "[ulnder
the longstanding law of Georgia, the parties to a lawsuit have a
fundamental right to be present in court during the trial of their case,"
which does not depend on the competence of the parties.'4 9 This right
to be present includes a "personal element"; "[tihe right is based not only

143. Id. at *14.
144. Id. at *1.
145. 291 Ga. 380, 728 S.E.2d 557 (2012).
146. Id. at 381, 728 S.E.2d at 559.
147. Id. at 381, 395, 728 S.E.2d at 559, 568.
148. Id. at 381, 728 S.E.2d at 559. The court of appeals held that a trial judge could
exclude a party if the judge made written findings that:
(1) the plaintiff is severely injured; (2) the plaintiff attributes those injuries to the
conduct of the defendant(s); (3) there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiffs
presence in the courtroom will cause the jury to be biased toward the plaintiff
based on sympathy rather than the evidence such that the jury would be
prevented or substantially impaired from performing its duty; (4) the plaintiff is
unable to communicate with counsel or to participate in the trial in any meaningful way; and (5) the plaintiff is unable to comprehend the proceedings.
Id. at 383, 728 S.E.2d at 560-61. When all of those circumstances exist, the court of
appeals ruled that the party was essentially an exhibit-a piece of evidence-and could be
excluded. Id. at 383, 728 S.E.2d at 561.
149. Id. at 380, 394-96, 728 S.E.2d at 559, 568-69.
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on what the party can do to the case, but on what the case will do to the
party."150
In Reese v. Ford Motor Co.,1"' the court of appeals held that the
State Court of Cobb County did not abuse its discretion when it granted
an extraordinary motion for a new trial based on Ford Motor Company's
failure to identify its insurance carriers in response to the plaintiffs'
interrogatory.152 The plaintiffs did not learn about Ford's intentionally
misleading discovery responses until after trial, and these responses
prevented jurors from being properly qualified regarding their relationships with the insurance carriers.'
As a matter of first impression, the supreme court held in Stolte v.
Fagan154 that (1) civil litigants are entitled to the removal of unqualified jurors before they exercise their peremptory strikes just as parties
in criminal cases are, and (2) a trial court must take corrective measures
to remedy an improper argument in a civil case pursuant to its duties
under O.C.G.A. § 9-10-185,"5 without regard to whether a specific
remedy was requested by the objecting party.s'
In Holland v. Caviness,"' on a certified question from the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, the Georgia
Supreme Court held, that pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6,1's the
defendant's "worldly circumstances" may not be considered in deciding
the amount of damages when the only harm is to the plaintiffs "peace,
happiness, or feelings."159 The court also overruled Tahamtan v.

150. Id. at 392, 728 S.E.2d at 566. Instead of excluding the party, the court directed
the trial court to use common methods to ensure that both parties would have a fair trial,
including changing venue, asking questions during voir dire and excluding prospective
jurors for cause or peremptorily, excluding evidence that violates O.C.G.A. § 24-4-403,
restricting opening statements and closing arguments, issuing jury instructions, and using
the appeals process to review a jury verdict. Id. at 381, 387-88, 728 S.E.2d at 559, 563-64.
151. 320 Ga. App. 78, 738 S.E.2d 301 (2013).
152. Id. at 80-81, 738 S.E.2d at 303.
153. Id. at 79-80, 738 S.E.2d at 303.
154. 291 Ga. 477, 731 S.E.2d 653 (2012).
155. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-185 (2007).
156. Stolte, 291 Ga. at 478-81, 731 S.E.2d at 655-56. The court also held that other
improper closing argument statements about the "trust" the defendant's patients placed
in him, which were not objected to at trial, would be subject to review on remand, but only
regarding "whether the improper argument in reasonable probability changed the result
of the trial." Id. at 482-83, 731 S.E.2d at 657 (quoting Mullins v. Thompson, 274 Ga. 366,
367, 553 S.E.2d 154 (2001)).
157. 292 Ga. 332, 737 S.E.2d 669 (2013).
158. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6 (2000).
159. Holland, 292 Ga. at 332, 737 S.E.2d at 669-70. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6 provides that
"[in a tort action in which the entire injury is to the peace, happiness, or feelings of the
plaintiff, no measure of damages can be prescribed except the enlightened consciences of
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6 to the extent it held the defendant's worldly circumstancTahamtan"'
es could be considered. 6 1

N. Apportionment
In Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc.,162 the Georgia Supreme Court held
in response to a certified question from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia that (1) the jury is allowed to
apportion damages pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33163 between a
criminal assailant and the defendant property owner in a premises
liability action, and (2) a jury instruction or special verdict form to that
effect does not violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights to a jury trial,
due process, or equal protection.'64
First, the court ruled that because the intentional tortfeasor was at
least partially at "fault"for the attack under a plain reading of O.C.G.A.
§ 51-12-33, his liability should be apportioned with the defendant
property owner's liability.'65 "Fault" is used in O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33
without limitation and thus includes all wrongdoing-whether intentional or otherwise.16 The court determined this holding was consistent
with the purpose of the apportionment statute, which is "to have the jury
consider all of the tortfeasors who may be liable to the plaintiff together,
so their respective responsibilities for the harm can be determined."'
Second, the court found a jury instruction or special verdict form
allowing for apportionment between intentional and negligent tortfeasors
would be constitutional because (1) the right to a jury trial would not be
violated as the jury is not abdicating its normal function in apportioning
damages, (2) the statutory scheme is "discernible" and gives "adequate
guidance" consistent with due process, and (3) the statute, by requiring
fault to be apportioned among all tortfeasors, is supported by a rational
basis consistent with the equal protection clause.16 1

impartial jurors. In such an action, punitive damages ... shall not be awarded." O.C.G.A.
§ 51-12-6.
160. 204 Ga. App. 680, 420 S.E.2d 363 (1992).
161. Holland, 292 Ga. at 337 n.9, 737 S.E.2d at 673 n.9.
162. 291 Ga. 359, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012).
163. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 (2000 & Supp. 2013).
164. Couch, 291 Ga. at 359, 729 S.E.2d at 379.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 365, 729 S.E.2d at 383 (interpreting O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 367, 729 S.E.2d at 384.
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In Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Heard,' the court of appeals
was also called to interpret the apportionment statute.'7 0 Relevant
here, the court determined that apportionment does not apply to
settlements in light of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33's requirement that a "trier of
fact" be the entity to apportion damages, which does not occur in
settlement, and O.C.G.A. § 51-12-32(a)'s17 1 provision that a right of
contribution exists when the apportionment statute does not apply.172
IV.

CONCLUSION

The above cases and legislation have in the Authors' estimation most
significantly affected trial practice and procedure in Georgia over the
survey period. This Article, however, is not intended to be exhaustive
of all legal developments for this topic.

169. 321 Ga. App. 325, 740 S.E.2d 429 (2013).
170. Zurich Am. Ins., 321 Ga. App. at 329, 740 S.E.2d at 432.
171. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-32(a) (2000).
172. Zurich Am. Ins., 321 Ga. App. at 330, 740 S.E.2d at 432-33. The court also held
that the defendants were joint tortfeasors-notwithstanding that the defendants were
pursued in separate legal proceedings and the professional services defendants' settlement
agreement specifically stated that the general contractor's settlement was not based on
their negligence-because their separate acts of negligence combined naturally and directly
into a single indivisible injury-the moisture incursion. Id. at 327 n.1, 331, 740 S.E.2d at
431 n.1, 433.

